The attempt to explore, through philosophical reflection or academic inquiry, the relationship between war and development has a long history. It is only with the end of the Cold War, however, that "peacebuilding" came to be identified as a distinctive concept referring to activities by external actors aimed at establishing foundations for lasting peace and development. The chapter examines the post-Cold War rise of peacebuilding as an activity that has come to involve a major role for development and development actors. It considers the geo-political and normative background to the rise, and traces the initial efforts to operationalize the concept of "post-conflict peacebuilding". It is specifically concerned with the challenges that war-torn societies have posed for development actors wedded to "traditional," often technocratic and self-consciously apolitical modes of engagement. It also considers the growing importance attached to local context and local realities in discussions of peacebuilding and development.
Introduction
Arguing that security had for too long been identified with "exclusively military phenomena," the future president of the World Bank emphasized that without development, security would forever remain an elusive goal. There was, he insisted, a direct and positive correlation between development, political stability, and peace.
On the other hand, and more indirectly, the Cold War had done much to ensure that the worlds of development and security, those inhabited by policy-makers and practitioners as well as those populated by academics and think tanks, had remained heavily compartmentalized. The end of the Cold War brought those worlds closer together. In part this was a result of the liberating impact of the passing of the old order on the study of "security." As the stable management of relations between East and West ceased to be the overarching preoccupation of policy-makers and academics, traditional conceptions of security came to be questioned more widely on the grounds that they were overly statecentric and too accepting of the distinction-seen as increasingly untenable in a more "globalized" and interdependent world-between issues of "low" and "high" politics. In their place, a broader understanding, encompassing what the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) described in its 1994 Human Development Report as "new dimensions of security," was called for. Significantly, the same UNDP report-self-avowedly "peoplecentered" in its orientation-introduced the notion of "human security," a multi-dimensional conception of security that included, inter alia, economic, food and health security (UNDP 1994) . While human security may thus be seen as an invitation to re-think conventional and state-centric understandings of security, it was also an implied criticism of Chapter 21
Page 10 the tendency among neoclassical economists to place the goal of economic growth at the center of the meaning of development (see Harris in this volume).
These changes in the discourse on security and development have been seen by many as evidence of an epoch-making shift in normative attitudes among members of international society following the end of the Cold War. Whether a "solidarist consensus" has in fact emerged among states, however, remains a moot point and, unsurprisingly, claims to that effect have been far more muted after the events of 9/11 and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Still, there is no question but that humanitarian issues, broadly conceived, have become more prominent on the international agenda with the passing of the old bipolar order. This can be seen above all in the remarkable growth of "peace operations" since the early 1990s and the tendency for international military action-whether coercive or consent-based-increasingly to be justified on humanitarian grounds (Roberts 2001) . And this brings us to the second major reason for concentrating discussion of the history and practice of development and peacebuilding on the post-Cold War period.
The post-Cold War era has witnessed a dramatic growth in externally aided efforts to consolidate and build, as the jargon would have it, "self-sustaining" peace in countries emerging from war and violence. Concerned with the legacies and socio-economic dislocations brought about by internal conflict and civil war, peacebuilding mandates have typically been framed in deeply ambitious terms, aimed at nothing less than the wholesale transformation of conflict-affected societies. It is the intrusive character and the sheer transformative ambition of modern peacebuilding that have brought to the fore a wide range of practical, conceptual, and even philosophical issues regarding its relationship to development.
From An Agenda for Peace to "Obstacles to Peacebuilding"
The term "post-conflict peacebuilding" was coined by then UN Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali in An Agenda for Peace, a report commissioned by the Security Council in January 1992 to provide member states with recommendations on how to improve the organization's capacity for "preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peacekeeping." The final report defined peacebuilding as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (Boutros-Ghali 1992) . Its identification as a separate category of action was premised on the conviction that placing "an achieved peace on a durable foundation" required simultaneous, mutually reinforcing action in a wide range of areas, from political to "legal, institutional, military, humanitarian, human rights-related, environmental, economic and social, cultural or demographic" (United Nations 1998: paragraph 65).
At one level, this was a conception of peacebuilding-aspirational, broad, and ambitiouswith which it is difficult to quarrel. It was also a reflection of the optimism that marked debates at the time about the UN's role in a world no longer at the mercy of Cold War rivalry. The initial elaboration of the concept contained little, however, about implementation and, in particular, was silent on how development-and specifically what kind of development priorities-would reinforce the desired end-state of peacebuilding. More
Chapter 21 Page 13 problematic still, the catch-all nature of the concept served to obscure the importance of distinguishing strategically between different, potentially competing peacebuilding goals in the aftermath of armed conflict (Cousens 2001: 10 and 13 
Key issues and controversies
Beyond drawing attention to the crisis in El Salvador, "Obstacles to Peacebuilding" may usefully be seen as having identified three sets of issues that have remained at the centre of discussions about the relationship between development and peacebuilding.
The first concerns the lack of transparency, flexibility, and coordination within the UN "system" and the wider donor community when confronted with the particular challenges of war-torn societies.
to peacebuilding, as well as in the design of specific policies in "post-conflict" settings-the far-reaching and transformative effects that war and protracted violence invariably have on state and society. In part this is about a proper appreciation of the political, social, and economic costs of war and their legacy effects. It is also, however, about the importance of understanding better the distinctive political economies that emerge in the course of war and that persist (if in mutated form) into the "post-conflict" period.
The third issue was only alluded to by de Soto and del Castillo: whether the fundamental priorities of international financial institutions in the case of El Salvador-aiming for macroeconomic stability and rapid economic growth through the application of the strictures of the "Washington Consensus," with its emphasis on fiscal discipline, privatization, and liberalization-are at all appropriate to countries emerging from war.
Transparency, flexibility, and coordination
The principal policy concern of de Soto and del Castillo in 1994 was the absence of any kind of consultation, let alone strategic coordination, among the bodies charged with shepherding forward fragile peace processes on the one hand, and those concerned with development and
Chapter 21 Page 16 economic policies on the other. The problem has since come to be described somewhat euphemistically as one of limited "system-wide coherence," and its persistence among UN agencies and donors remains a very real obstacle to the attainment of strategic objectives in peacebuilding (UN 2006) . Related to this, however, was a further obstacle, again not confined to El Salvador: the lack of external funding for politically sensitive but critical peace-related programs, most notably for DDR and SSR activities aimed at reintegrating excombatants into civil society and productive economic life after the termination of armed conflict (and thus, in theory, also reallocating resources and manpower away from the military sector towards developmental objectives). In addition to the obvious political sensitivities to include countries emerging from armed conflict. Since the mid-1990s, the World Bank's concessional lending arm has provided more than $6 billion in reconstruction assistance to "fragile and conflict-affected states," and technical assistance, training and support for structural reform-covering areas such as banking reform, fiscal capacity, privatization, and "public enterprise restructuring"-have become routinized.
And yet, for all this, the suggestion that these changes in architecture and modalities for engagement in conflict-affected societies amount to a "fundamental change in the way the Bretton Woods institutions address their respective mandates" (del Castillo 2010: 84) remains deeply contested. As will be discussed more fully below, disagreement has centered on whether the underlying or core priorities of the IFIs and donors have also changed to take account of the realities of post-war societies and the operational requirements that flow from these.
As for the wider issue of strategic coordination and system-wide-coherence, evidence of progress is still harder to detect. The deeper source of the problem here lies in the functionally fragmented, inter-governmental, and deeply political character of the UN "system." UN agencies, funds, and programs each have their own budgets, charters, and governing bodies (on which sit donors), resulting in a loose confederal system that is resistant to partial reform and remains, in crucial respects, profoundly dysfunctional.
The resulting challenge is not a new one. An early report (produced in 1969) on the UN development system memorably concluded that the UN undertook activities with "very little 'brain' to guide it" and that "its absence may well be the greatest constraint on all capacity" (Jackson 1969 ). The growth of UN peacebuilding activities over the past twenty years has magnified the tensions built into the system, tensions which a proliferation of new coordinating mechanisms have only partly mitigated. Even the establishment in 2005 of the much-vaunted Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and an associated Peace Support Officespecifically intended to coordinate the actions of peacebuilding actors-has not managed to overcome the structural and political obstacles to effective coordination and delivery.
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Behind de Soto and del Castillo's concern with coordination and flexibility lies a more serious issue: the need for donors to recognize that the formal end of hostilities following armed conflict does not signify that either peacebuilding or development ever starts from scratch. In part that recognition involves treating societies emerging from conflict on their own terms, acknowledging historical context as well as the cultural, economic, and political specificities of war-torn societies. Equally important, it requires an appreciation of the transformative effects of war itself, of the destruction and suffering it involves to be sure, but also of its differential impact on societies and groups within it and on the complex and innovative ways that politico-economic elites and ordinary people adapt to wartime conditions and protracted violence. The result of these transformations is to ensure that "postconflict" situations present challenges very different from those of "traditional" development, including those associated with recovery from natural disasters. There are three aspects to the distinctive nature of "post-conflict" societies to which scholars and, increasingly, practitioners have drawn attention.
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The primacy of political considerations in peacebuilding
Political stability in post-war settings, especially following negotiated settlements aimed at ending civil wars, is invariably fragile and susceptible to reversal and breakdown, as the history of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Angola in the 1990s showed all too well. In Cambodia,
Mozambique, Guatemala, El Salvador, Bosnia, and Kosovo, the formal end of hostilities marked the beginning of peacebuilding, not the end of peace processes. In these circumstances, the requirements of political stabilization must assume priority. This, perhaps the chief lesson from post-Cold War peacebuilding efforts, carries important implications for the design of economic policies and the involvement of development actors in peacebuilding.
As James Boyce makes clear, it means, above all, that "'optimal economic policies' are often not possible or even desirable in the short run. Indeed, pursuing policies that are optimal from an economic viewpoint . . . can have tragic consequences for the political, security and social transitions" (Boyce 2002: 4) .
The socio-economic costs and dislocations of war
The direct and indirect costs of war and protracted violence present post-war development challenges that are, arguably, better understood now than they were in the mid-1990s. Even though there is considerable variability across cases, wars are, unsurprisingly, destructive and destroys capital and infrastructure, and it acts as a disincentive to saving and investment.
Importantly, as Frances Stewart and Valpy FitzGerald have shown in a wide-ranging and comparative study of war and underdevelopment, "the range of capital destruction in wartime is not only broad but also concentrated on those capacities which are recognized as being critical for sustainable development in poor countries" (Stewart and FitzGerald 2001: 16) . 
The political economy of war and peace
While the economic costs and developmental damage of war are real and incontrovertible, it is also the case that war does not bring economic activity, or indeed development, to a halt. David Keen has persuasively argued that the political economy perspective poses a fundamental challenge to the way the development community has traditionally thought about war (Keen 1997) . That community's tendency, often implicit in the design of projects and interventions, has been to treat war as a form of "developmental malaise:" that is, to see it merely as the collapse or breakdown of an otherwise peaceful and linear trajectory of growth and development. Thus, the IMF's approach to EPCA, alluded to above, "is based on the notion that conflicts, like natural disasters, are essentially temporary negative shocks that require only a relatively short period of reform and assistance" (IMF 2008: 10-11) . In this view, the separation between war and peace is essentially clear-cut and unambiguous.
And yet since war and protracted violence also involve the emergence of new socioeconomic and political orders that outlive the formal end of hostilities, such a sharp distinction between "war" and "peace" is not tenable. To acknowledge this is also to accept a different understanding of what is actually involved in transitions from war to peace, an understanding based on an appreciation of who stands to benefit and who stands to lose from continued conflict, not on the belief than one is dealing with a clean slate. It also means that pre-packaged or templated solutions to the challenges of post-war development and recovery are likely not only to fail but to have unintended and perverse consequences. 
Goals, tasks, and priorities
Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo were concerned, above all, with the failure of external actors to synchronize economic policies with political processes aimed at consolidating peace in post-war El Salvador. They did not, however, fundamentally question the central objective of the IFIs' adjustment policies in the country. And yet much of the debate surrounding the contribution of development to peacebuilding since the mid-1990s has focused on the approach of the IFIs to post-conflict situations, these having provided the dominant template, also for the wider donor community, for the kind of developmental and economic objectives that should be pursued in societies emerging from war.
The debate has revolved around the appropriateness of imposing a set of policy priorities on post-war countries derived from the so-called "Washington Consensus," a term coined by John Williamson in 1989 and at the heart of which, in terms of policy prescription, was an emphasis on "disciplined macroeconomic policies, the use of markets and trade liberalization" (Williamson 2004 ).
The core principle guiding policy was a reliance on market mechanisms, the effective functioning of which was to be advanced through promoting three key "pillars" of Washington Consensus advice (Stiglitz 2002: 53) . The first is fiscal consolidation, to be
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This brings us to the second, more radical or uncompromising line of criticism of Washington Consensus policies and their application to post-war settings. These not only emphasize lack of results on the ground but stress the real and lasting damage done to the prospects of peace stemming from a fundamental incommensurability of IFIs' institutional goals and the requirements of post-war peacebuilding. Susan Woodward puts it bluntly: "Neither the IMF nor the World Bank seeks to build peace." Instead, "their goal is to transform the structure of prewar and wartime economic and political power to create a state that facilitates privatesector, market-led growth, particularly its capacity to service its foreign debt while lowering public expectations to that which a country can afford" (Woodward 2012: 13) .
It is a line of criticism shared by those who have come to view the IFIs and Western donors more generally as pursuing what amounts to a "liberal peace project," a "project" that not only "ignores the socio-economic problems confronting war-torn societies" but actively "aggravates the vulnerability of sectors of the populations to poverty and does little either to alleviate people's engagement in shadow economies or to give them a say in economic reconstruction" (Pugh 2005: 25) . The actual existence of a coherent "project" pursued by Western donors to impose a "liberal peace" has for good reasons been called into question, not only as an empirical reality but also as a useful conceptual construct (Zaum 2012) . Even so, writers on the "liberal peace" have offered an important and critical corrective to the more technocratic and unreflective donor discourse on development and peacebuilding. Drawing attention to the "silence surrounding structural violence" and the neglect of the "everyday experiences of people" (Pugh, Cooper, and Turner 2008: 4) , they have called for alternative policies and "emancipatory engagement with local populations," giving priority to social
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into peacebuilding (Richmond 2008: 300) . Rather than relying on privatization and exports, investment should be targeting public goods, infrastructure, and, above all, employment.
Bottom-up versus top-down
Understanding local context and informal power structures is one of the central themes to have emerged from the post-Cold War experience, policy, and academic discussion of peacebuilding. Indeed, some of the most trenchant criticisms of international peacebuilding efforts in recent years have centered on its "top-down" character and the concomitant tendency not only to ignore micro-level sources of violence, but also to neglect potentially promising "bottom-up" processes likely to reinforce sustainable peace (Autesserre 2010) . In terms of the latter-that is, in terms of seeing post-conflict societies and local actors as a positive resource and an essential partner in the quest for peace-two aspects of the debate regarding the contribution of development to peacebuilding merit special attention. Rather than concentrate on constitutional and security issues at the outset, negotiations focused on post-war reconstruction and development. . . . The rationale behind this approach was that parties who had been acculturated to a process of functional cooperation on reconstruction and development activities would then be able to deal with macro-political issues on the basis of embedded trust.
( Mac Ginty 2010: 47-8) Others have, quite rightly, cautioned against too simplistic, even romantic, an embrace of the "local." As noted earlier, the political economy of many post-conflict settings often involves violent, predatory, and exploitative practices by local elites, spoilers, and power structures. one study found that foreign aid and expenditures by UNTAC placed upward pressure on local wages and the price of housing stock, and "diverted labor and investment away from the production of goods towards tertiary sector activities providing services essentially for foreigners living in Cambodia" (UNRISD 1993: 21) . Market distortions of this kind have also been compounded by a strong and persistent bias among peacebuilders (especially the UN and its agencies) against using local suppliers for goods and services, something that has acted as a brake on the creation of local capacity and has done little to stimulate local economic activity or help unleash entrepreneurial energies in aid of recovery.
There are other distortions that come from the infusion of aid into weak and fragile post-war economies, one of which is the danger of aid flows '"crowding out" domestic revenue mobilization, reducing the incentive for governments to tax their own populace (Boyce 2010: 105) . Another anomaly, also highlighted by Boyce, are the "pervasive tax exemptions" that exist on post-war aid flows and that not only deprive the government of powerful people do not have to pay taxes" (Boyce 2010 ).
Most of these adverse and distorting effects of large peacebuilding footprints are now recognized, on paper at any rate, by donors and aid bureaucracies. An important step in mitigating them, it is widely accepted, would be to "avoid excessive reliance on parallel mechanisms to deliver development assistance" (UNDP 2008: xx) and to try instead to route aid through national and local government, in so doing also strengthening the legitimacy of local and national governments, itself an important peacebuilding objective. Complementing this, much greater efforts can be made, especially by the UN and its agencies, to procure supplies locally-thus stimulating local investment and private sector activity-and to adopt a wages policy that would counter the worst distortions introduced by excessive salaries. In The consequences of this can be catastrophic. In an important work on the development community's involvement in Rwanda in the years before the genocide, including the period of the Arusha peace process, Peter Uvin notes how the country was widely thought of as "a well-developing country-facing serious development problems, but dealing with them much more effectively than were other countries" (Uvin 1998: 2) . It now, of course, represents an "extreme example" of the "failure of development aid," one in which "the process of development and the international aid given to promote it interacted with the forces of exclusion, inequality, pauperization, racism, and oppression that laid the groundwork for the 1994 genocide" (Uvin 1998: 3) . The story of Rwanda, Uvin concludes, made "one more case for broadening the concept of development" beyond the focus on economic growth at the
